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1 Introduction
In many OECD countries the eﬀective retirement age is well below the statutory
retirement age. The major reason for the low labor-force participation of the 55 to 64
age group are high net withdrawal rates, i.e. a major reduction in employment ﬁgures
w h e nm o v i n gt ot h en e x th i g h e ra g eg r o u p .A tt h es a m et i m e ,m a n yg o v e r n m e n t s
consider extending working life as the dominant strategy for keeping the pension
system sustainable,1 while keeping the standard of living (almost) constant because
individuals continue to earn an income. This argument, however, depends strongly
on the supply of and the demand for older workers. It implicitly presumes that
workers remain employable until the new, higher retirement age. However, if the
eﬀective, or rather economic, retirement age does not increase when the statutory
retirement age is raised, old-age poverty of large groups in society could be the
result.
For instance, Butrica et al. (2002) show that raising the statutory retirement
age will contribute strongly to the projected rise in old-age poverty in the US.2
Likewise, extended periods of unemployment are seen as a major explanation for
old-age poverty (see e.g., Smeeding, 1999, 2001; Gottschalk, 2006; or Favreault
and Steuerle, 2008). In the context of pension reform, increasing the employability
of older people is therefore highly important. As Holzmann (2005) argues, the
employability of older workers calls for changes in the wage proﬁle and for measures
to maintain and raise their productivity, especially the implementation of lifelong
learning.
There is no doubt that a pension system’s ﬁscal impact plays an important role
in keeping labor-force participation of older workers low, for example by early-
1See e.g., Barr (2004, p. 209) or Cremer and Pestieau (2003) who even expect a “double
dividend” from raising the statutory retirement age. Based on a OLG-CGE model, Marchiori
(2008) explicitly considers raising the retirement age for unskilled workers in Europe to be the
most eﬀective measure for relieving ﬁscal pressure.
2Considering above-NAIRU economies, Michello and Ford (2006) argue that increasing retire-
ment age will directly add to unemployment.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 2
retirement schemes (see e.g., Gruber and Wise, 1999; or Fenge and Pestieau, 2006).
However, according to Duval (2003) only about one third of the decline in the older
males’ labor-force participation rate can be attributed to implicit tax rates and re-
tirement age.3 The rest stems from demand-side factors and preferences for leisure.
It is often claimed that the majority of older workers cannot choose to work until the
a g eo f6 7o rb e y o n da st h e r ei si n s u ﬃcient demand for this type of labor. Standard
arguments are costly seniority rules (Lazear 1979, 1981) and youth unemployment,
which is hoped to be overcome by pushing older workers out of work (see the dis-
cussion in Boldrin et al., 1999). Fenge and Pestieau (2006, p. 107) point out four
potential explanations for this eﬀect:
• Low-skilled older workers may exhibit declining relative productivity in times
of rapid technological change.
• Insuﬃcient training may contribute to declining productivity among older
workers.
• Rigid age-earnings proﬁles caused by speciﬁc institutional arrangements (e.g.
employment-protection legislation) reduce employment opportunities for the
older unemployed.
• Temporary negative demand shocks may lead to an irreversible labor force
withdrawal.
In this paper we focus on the ﬁrst two propositions. In today’s fast-changing
knowledge economy people need to upgrade their skills — in both the personal and
professional domain — throughout their adult lives to cope with modern life (OECD,
2007). Only this guarantees that they will remain employable for the duration of
their working life and beyond. In fact, several studies observe a growing impor-
tance of certain general and cognitive skills in the labor market.4 Not surprisingly,
3Johnson’s (2000) estimate of this measure is even lower at 11 per cent.
4See e.g., Gould (2002), Weinberg (2000), Murname et al. (1995) or Taber (2001). According
to Bishop (1991), however, the results are not as clear cut.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 3
lifelong learning for all has become a widely shared policy objective among indus-
trialized countries; a striking example being the European Union (starting with the
Lisbon Strategy) which concluded that a “need for a continuous renewal of citizens’
knowledge, skills and competencies is crucial for the EU’s competitiveness and so-
cial cohesion” (EU Commission, 2006). One central focus of our model will be the
question whether investing into general education or lifelong learning, respectively,
will indeed help to synchronize the economic and the statutory retirement age.
Over the past thirty years, in almost all industrialized countries the demand for
labor has shifted in favor of skilled workers. There is substantial evidence that
skill-biased technological progress and the globalization of production are among
the main driving forces of this shift in demand.5 As already mentioned in the
OECD Jobs Strategy (OECD, 1994), many industrialized countries have responded
by taking measures to improve the education of the workforce.6 Since older workers
are particularly aﬀected by technologically induced skill depreciation,7 adult training
and lifelong learning are an essential part of these programs. As the OECD (2004)
ﬁnds, “for older and low-educated workers, training allows attaining and maintaining
the competencies required to bring productivity in line with market wages, thereby
sustaining employment prospects of these groups” (OECD, 2004, p. 185). From a
theoretical perspective, standard arguments are that these competencies should be
suﬃciently general to facilitate adjustment to technological change (Welch, 1970)
and/or to future shocks as only this reduces uncertainty such that lower human-
capital investment is avoided (Lehvari and Weiss, 1974).
Despite these eﬀorts, the empirical evidence on returns to training and adult
learning is still inconclusive (OECD, 2004). In a study based on cross-sectional
aggregate data and longitudinal surveys, the OECD (2004) ﬁnds strong evidence of
5See Chennells and van Reenen (2002) for a survey of literature on skill biased technological
progress, OECD (1997) for employment eﬀects of internationalisation, and Nickell and Bell (1996)
for the impact on unemployment.
6See e.g. OECD (1994) for an analysis and OECD (2003) for related policy recommendations.
7See OECD (2004), Ch. 4 and the references therein.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 4
positive eﬀects of education and training on employment outcomes at the individual
level. These eﬀects are due to higher participation rates and a lower probability of
unemployment. The positive correlation between education and participation rates
is also evident at the aggregate level. However, there is still no empirical support
for a positive eﬀect of training on aggregate unemployment rates (see OECD, 2004,
p. 189).
Taking these stylized facts from the labor market as a point of departure we focus
on the production process and analyze the depreciation of human capital. We obtain
conditions for the economic retirement age of an aging workforce. In our approach
workers are heterogeneous. While all workers enjoy access to the same education, -
namely initial schooling and thereafter a lifelong learning program -, the distribution
of learning capabilities aﬀects workers in diﬀerent ways. For a given level of spending
into a lifelong learning program a fraction of the workforce becomes adaptable to new
generations of technologies. For the remainder the present lifelong learning program
is not successful; hence they are left with vintage speciﬁc skills acquired during
initial schooling. These are subject to economic depreciation as the generations of
technologies age. We choose a vintage model because technological change aﬀects
existing and new production processes asymmetrically.8 To avoid results that are
simply due to a limitational production structure, the vintage model is of the putty-
putty type. In a putty-putty vintage model, production factors can be substituted
at the time when the technology is installed and also when it is in use.
The analysis will show that technological progress leads to a speciﬁce m p l o y m e n t
structure. Due to technological progress, the most recent vintages of adaptable
workers are most productive. Therefore, the demand and input of adaptable work-
ers decline as vintages age. Accordingly, due to cross eﬀects of production factors
the productivity of vintage speciﬁc skills in older vintages decreases as well. The de-
preciation of vintage speciﬁc human capital endogenously determines the economic
8The application of vintage models to labor markets, demographic developments and social
security systems was recently suggested by Mateos-Planas (2001), Boucekkine, de la Croix and
Licandro (2002), Echeveria and Iza (2006), and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007).Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 5
retirement age of the respective workers. If economic falls short of statutory retire-
ment age, old age unemployment results. Even fully ﬂexible wages will not be able
to generate market equilibrium in the labor market segment of older workers. While
labor with adaptable technological competencies is able to switch to any technology
eﬃciently, labor using vintage speciﬁc skills is discarded no matter what wage they
would agree to work for.
Although technological progress is most important for the human-capital depre-
ciation process, it is also the most diﬃcult to inﬂuence. Improving education is
often suggested to increase the productivity of aging labor and thus to keep labor
employed until the statutory retirement age is reached. However, while this appears
plausible at a ﬁrst glance, it is not the outcome of our theoretical analysis. We
distinguish between two stages of education, initial schooling and lifelong learning
and all workers have to undergo both stages of education. Depending on their ed-
ucational success they will obtain adaptable or vintage speciﬁc skills. With respect
to the eﬀects of education policy we ﬁnd that:
• An improvement in initial schooling, that is, education before working life
starts, will aﬀect income levels and the distribution of income. However, spend-
ing on initial education has no eﬀect on the depreciation rate of human capital
and the economic retirement age of inﬂexible workers.
• Whether lifelong learning programs can help to adjust the speed of the de-
preciation process partly depends on the substitutability of diﬀerent types of
workers. However, even if lifelong learning programs fail to solve the problem
of synchronizing economic and statutory retirement age they still help to in-
crease the individual probability of ﬁnding a job when people grow older and
hence reduces the unemployment rate of an aging generation.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we will introduce a model of endogenous
depreciation of human capital. In Section 3 the model is solved for the steady
state. To show the eﬀects of the putty-putty technology with diﬀerent elasticitiesStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 6
of substitutions ex ante and ex post, the development of labor demand and the
output of a given technology vintage is discussed. In Section 4 the results and
implications with respect to the retirement age and education systems are presented
and in Section 5 we conclude.
2 A Human Capital Vintage Model
Vintage models were introduced in the 1950s and 60s to analyze the eﬀects of techno-
logical progress. The complexity and implications of the technical diﬀusion process
have recently encouraged a number of authors to apply a vintage approach with em-
bodied technologies in growth models.9 In general, vintage models are used where
aggregate (closed) production functions with disembodied technologies do not seem
to be an appropriate instrument to model the interaction of newly implemented
capital, existing capital and new technologies. The most important diﬀerence to a
closed form aggregate production function is that the substitution process of factors
is relatively more diﬃcult for already installed production processes compared to
currently implemented processes.
In the real world technological advances are often implemented via new invest-
ments. Running these new technologies often requires an adaptation of production
processes and skills. As technical progress is not just an invention of a technology
but also a diﬀusion through the production process, education and the structure
of education plays an important role for a society’s ability to implement technical
progress. These ideas, technology adoption and the role of education ﬁrst developed
by Stephens (1971), van Imhoﬀ (1988), or Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), were re-
9E.g. Boucekkine and Pommeret (2004) discuss the implementation of energy saving technolo-
gies when energy prices increase. Boucekkine, Licandro, Puch and del Rio (2005) introduce the
vintage approach into the AK-model of endogenous growth, illustrating that introducing vintage
capital changes the dynamics of a growth process substantially. Optimal investment strategies un-
der diﬀerent external conditions and expectations are considered by Gilchrist and Williams (2005),
Feichtinger et al. (2006) or Goetz et. al. (2008).Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 7
cently taken up again. Mateos-Planas (2001) considers the eﬀectiveness of schooling
and technology speciﬁc learning-by-doing. Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro
(2002) deﬁne generation speciﬁc human capital and analyze demographic phenom-
ena (like change in life expectancy) in an endogenous growth OLG setting. In this
model each generation is tied to its own vintage technology and accumulates pure
vintage speciﬁc human capital. The human capital vintage structure is regarded
a sa ni m p o r t a n ti n g r e d i e n tt oc o v e rt h ea g i n ge ﬀects of a non homogeneous human
capital stock for endogenous education and retirement decision as well as for per
capita growth. With a model similar to Boucekkine et al. (2002) Echevaria and
Iza (2007) include social security eﬀects on education and retirement decision and
analyze how life expectancy aﬀects per capita growth. The problem of skill trans-
ferability between subsequent technology generations and the eﬀects on the labor
market are addressed by Violante (2002). One mechanism of his analysis is based
on vintage speciﬁc human capital. When separating in a labor market matching
model workers can only partially transfer their skills to machines. This limited ﬂex-
ibility due to vintage speciﬁc human capital increases wage losses upon separation.
A matching model with vintage speciﬁc human capital was built by Hornstein et al.
(2007). The paper addresses changes in labor demand due to changes in technology.
In this model the focus lies on frictions and the labor market matching process.
The vintage structure of production contributes to the matching problem. Rather
than emphasizing the ﬁrms’ costs of "posting vacancies", the paper stresses the up-
front, irreversible costs of investing in equipment as the typical vintage model. As
a result capital-embodied technological change reduces labour demand and raises
equilibrium unemployment and unemployment duration.
Based on the above discussion we assume that technical progress can only be
implemented if an adjustment in skills enables the use of a new generation (vintage)
of technology. Moreover, Mateos-Planas (2001) identiﬁed two hypotheses about
the eﬀects of education in the literature. One postulates that education provides a
productivity advantage which is independent of experience. Education not only has aStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 8
productivity eﬀect and generates human capital. According to the other hypothesis,
education improves the ability of agents to adapt new technologies, hence education
generates technological ﬂexiblitiy. Only this education eﬀect makes it possible to
combine new technologies with suﬃciently educated labor to handle it. Hence, there
is an important interaction between the implementation of new technologies and a
reallocation in the labor market. The schooling system in our model addresses both
aspects of education.
Schooling system: To determine domestic labor input, we need to characterize
the workforce. The schooling process is modeled as a sequence of two education
cycles. Initial schooling is followed by a lifelong learning program. All workers Ns
V
of each vintage V have to participate in both education cycles.
Initial schooling equips workers with skills that enable them to use the most
modern technology available at the time when a new generation of workers enters
the market. Apart from providing a basic educational grounding, these skills lead to
a human capital endowment of the workers that is related only to the most recent
technology vintage introduced.
Starting with initial schooling the human capital endowment of the workforce
of each vintage is determined by the rate of income τ1 spent on initial schooling .
Assuming a minimum required level τmin
1 , initial schooling is supposed to be equally
successful for all and hence equally spread over the whole workforce.10 The vintage






where Y (t) denotes aggregate income. Therefore, after initial schooling each worker
is endowed with a human capital endowment hV(t,t) tied to the technology vintage
10This is the "neutrality hypothsis" in Mateos-Planas (2001). See also Lucas (1988), Grossman
and Helpman (1991, Ch. 5) and others.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 9
of the period of his initial education.11 This basic human capital endowment is the
asset the worker can oﬀer on the labor market at any time.
In this model lifelong learning is a resource-absorbing schooling program.W i t ha
lifelong learning program workers will be instructed to adjust to each following gen-
eration (most recent vintage) of technologies. Successful attendance in lifelong learn-
ing programs allows workers to adapt to the newest technology.12 Hence successful
attendance in a lifelong learning program enables to switch between all technology
vintages installed. An established lifelong learning program helps aging workers to
adapt to changing technologies.13
If for a worker a lifelong learning program is not successful he still has his ability
of using and handling the technology vintage he originally learned to use when he
once entered the labor market as a young person.
While we assume that initial schooling is equally successful for all workers, the
eﬀects of the lifelong learning program a r em o r ec o m p l e x .I nf a c tw ea s s u m et h a tt h e
domestic labor force is heterogeneous in terms of learning abilities. Therefore, even
if all workers undergo both types of education, the success of the lifelong learning
program depends on the distribution of the population’s learning capabilities.
Let q denote the average probability that the lifelong learning program is success-
ful. Further, we assume that q is determined by the resources spent on this program
(RII = τ2Y ) and the distribution of the population’s learning capabilities:
11Concerning this assumption Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2002) argue on page 343
that "... diﬀerent generations have diﬀerent learning experiences and ... the aggregate stock
of human capital is built from the human capital of diﬀerent generations. The most important
characteristic of a growth theory designed to shed light on these issues is clearly to capture the
vintage nature of human capital."
12This is the "learning hypothsis" in Mateos-Planas (2001) which refers to an education concept
as suggested by Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch (1970) and others.
13With this assumption we depart from Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2002) who deﬁne
pure vintage speciﬁc human capital and do not allow a switch from one to another technology
vintage.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 10
q = q(RII)=q(τ2Y ).
Therefore, the more resources spent on lifelong learning programs each year, the
more likely the success and the ability of workers to adapt to new technologies
(
∂q
∂RII > 0). Further, heterogeneous abilities of the workforce cause the marginal
eﬀectiveness of additional spending to decrease. Thus, even if all workers attend the
lifelong learning program the increase in the probability of success of such a program
decreases with an increasing level of RII (
∂2q
∂R2
II < 0) . H e n c ew ec a nd e t e r m i n et h e






For the remaining fraction of workers the investments of the lifelong learning pro-
gram were not suﬃcient to generate an ability to switch to the most recent vintage










We will skip the E henceforth, as we are interested only in the expected value. Even
if these workers can still oﬀer their existing human capital during initial schooling,
their human capital is connected to the vintage speciﬁc technology and hence re-
mains a vintage speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a lhV(t,t) throughout their entire economic
life.
Labor market: The eﬀects of the lifelong learning program together with the dis-
tribution of abilities among the population has created two labor market segments.
First, the two education cycles lead to a workforce oﬀering vintage speciﬁc skills.
Education eﬀorts for lifelong learning were not suﬃciently eﬀective to enable these
Ns
V,I workers to adapt other technologies than the ones they learned to use duringStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 11
initial schooling. Therefore, these workers continue to use the same technology
throughout their working life. The human capital level of a whole vintage is the
human capital endowment multiplied by the number of workers using vintage speciﬁc
skills:
HV(t,t)=hV(t,t)NV,I.
While in traditional vintage models the technology can be represented by real cap-
ital, here vintage speciﬁc human capital characterizes a certain production process
and technology. Assuming again perfectly competitive markets, a vintage of this




V,I =0 .W i t hm(t) generations of technologies in use, we obtain a demand
for m(t) vintages of labor with vintage speciﬁc skills. Denoting T as the statutory













Obviously, this kind of labor is fully employed only if T 5 m(t).I n t e r m s o f
retirement, this implies that the worker retires at the statutory retirement age T.
Second, another segment of the labor market consists of adaptable labor. For
these workers Ns
V,II the present level of spending on the lifelong learning program
was successful. If the lifelong learning program is successful, a worker is able to
adapt new technologies and hence can switch to any new generation of technologies
eﬃciently. Thus technological progress λV augments this type of labor. At time t





We assume that technological progress grows at the given rate ˆ λ :=
˙ λV
λV .14 Since
technological progress is embodied, λV will aﬀect only the current production vin-
14See de Mello (1995) or Boucekkine, Licandro, Puch and del Rio (2005) for endogenous growth
conditions in vintage models.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 12
tage and not existing production processes. This is a major diﬀerence of vintage
technologies compared to simple aggregate production functions.
Adaptable labor is demanded by the newest m(t) technologies. With T as the total
economic lifetime (given by the statutory retirement age), labor supply consists of
















As we assume perfectly competitive markets, workers descending from T vintages
will be in demand due to the newest technologies m. Thus, these workers will never
be unemployed. Their retirement usually begins at the statutory retirement age,
which is here equivalent to T.
Production: In a vintage approach the implementation of technical changes is
more complex than deﬁned by a closed (aggregate) production function. When in-
troducing a vintage model we have to consider the substitution possibilities ex post
and ex ante. For a given vintage technology, the inputs of production can easily
be substituted ex ante while there are limited substitution possibilities ex post. To
avoid results that are due to ﬁxed input relations we use a putty-putty vintage ap-
proach. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the elasticity of substitution ex ante is higher
than the elasticity of substitution ex post. Thus, the model is a combination of the
putty-putty approach ﬁrst modeled by Solow (1960) and the putty-clay approach
ﬁrst modeled by Johansen (1959) and Salter (1960).15 The putty-putty model below
allows for substitution and also describes an obvious adaptation and adjustment
problem generated by the technical requirements for adjusting technologies intro-
duced in the past.
The production ex ante and ex post is modeled by a nested CES function. Ag-
15Putty-putty models with limited substitution possibilities ex post can be found in Scheper
(1968), Zon (1994), and Meijers and Zon (1994), or Gilchrist and Williams (2005).Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 13





where m is the age of the oldest technology in use. At time t vintage output YV of
the vintage installed at υ is produced with imports Im and domestic labor services
S. At the time of installing a new technology, ex ante, the elasticity of substitution
is σ1 := 1




−ρ1 +( 1− γ)S(t,t)
−ρ1¢− 1
ρ1 . (3)
The already installed production process is more diﬃcult to adjust. Ex post the
inputs cannot be substituted to the same extent as ex ante. Thus, the elasticity of
substitution ex post (υ<t )i sσ2 = 1







The following two conditions ensure that the relation of factor productivity does not
change for the technology after it has been installed:




Formally, a continuous diﬀerentiable relation between the ex post and the ex ante
production function is guaranteed. γυ and δυ are determined depending on the
parameters γ and 1 − γ.
Labor services: The supply of labor services is modeled with a labor service
production function. Here again a putty-putty technology with diﬀerent elasticities
of substitution ex ante and ex post is considered. The ex ante production of labor




16We denote all variables belonging to a certain vintage with a subindex V .Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 14
The production inputs for the labor service are vintage speciﬁc human capital HV
and adaptable labor in eﬃciency units ΛV. Installing a new technology, vintage
speciﬁc human capital and ﬂexible labor can easily be substituted. Thus, the elas-
ticity of substitution is σ3 =1 . It is also possible to substitute the inputs ex post.
However, the elasticity of substitution ex post is assumed to be smaller than ex ante:
σ4 := 1







for υ<t . The following two conditions guarantee that the relation of productivity
does not change when moving from ex ante to ex post service production:




Thus, αυ and βυ are determined endogenously.
Eﬃcient factor allocation: With a putty-putty technology the eﬃcient alloca-
tion of inputs can be divided into two parts. (i) The optimal human capital and the
optimal import intensity are chosen by maximizing the proﬁts of employing vintage
speciﬁc human capital when installing a new technology. (ii) Since the production
factors can be substituted ex post, the relation of the inputs is chosen optimally after
installing a technology. While imports and adaptable workers are paid according to
their marginal product, vintage speciﬁc human capital and the respective workers
receive the residual income determined in a zero proﬁtm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u m .
(i) Let p be the price of imports. Adopting the small country assumption, p is











where r is the quasi-rent of vintage speciﬁc human capital and w t h ew a g er a t eo f
adaptable labor. Writing this equation in intensity formwe get (π := Π
Nd

















(yV(t,v) − pim(t,v) − w(t))e
−r(v−t)dv − κ(t,t).




































(ii) Having installed a technology the inputs are then inserted eﬃciently by max-
imizing the proﬁts of a certain technology (v= installing time, t= present time)
ΠV(v,t)=YV(v,t) − pIm(v,t) − w(t)N
d
V,II(v,t) − rV(v,t)HV(v,t).
rV is the vintage rental rate of vintage speciﬁc human capital determining the wage
of the respective labor of vintage speciﬁc labor. Since human capital is tied to a
certain vintage and no internal depreciation of human capital is considered, we have
HV(v,t)=HV(v,v). In contrast adaptable labor and imports inserted in a certain
technology can change after installing a technology. Thus, the following two proﬁt

















17For v = t this condition is equivalent to equation (12) — see Corollary 5.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 16












The scrapping rule is straightforward. A vintage is discarded after m vintages if
the proﬁts of the vintage vanish (see Benhabib and Rustichini, 1993, and van Hilten,
1991, for scrapping rules) i.e. the income of vintage speciﬁc human capital is zero,
if rV(t − m,t)=0or
YV(t − m,t) − pIm(t − m,t) − w(t)N
d
V,II(t − m,t)=0 . (16)
This scrapping rule determines the economic scrapping time m of a technology
vintage.
3 Solution of the Model
We solve the model for the steady state.18 To show the eﬀects of the putty-putty
technology, we focus on the development of the variables of one vintage. Equations
(2)-(16) determine the growth path of the endogenous variables. Due to its structure,
the model can be written in intensity form. The economy is in steady state if the
demand for adaptable labor of a new technology Nd
V,II(t,t) is constant — we do
not consider population growth — and vintage speciﬁc human capital and imports
grow at the rate of technological progress ˆ λ. It follows that the vintage output
yV(t,t), the aggregate output y,19 domestic labor services s(t,t),a n dt h ew a g er a t eo f
18For the convenience of the reader all relevant theorems and lemmas are presented in the
appendix.
19See Lemma 9.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 17
adaptable labor20 grow at the rate λ, while the scrapping time m,21 the coeﬃcients22
δt,γt,α t,βt as well as the quasi-rent23 r are constant in steady state.
Formally the model is solved in three steps:
First, the scrapping time m∗ is determined. A vintage is discarded if the rental rate
of human capital of a vintage rV(t,t+m∗)HV(t,t)=YV(t,t+m∗)−pIm(t,t+m∗)−
w(t + m∗)Nd
V,II(t,t + m∗) is zero. The condition is determined by the structure of
the growth rates in steady state. m∗ is not dependent on the level of the output or


















Second, to obtain the remaining variables human capital intensity and the quasi-rent
have to be determined. Depending on κ the growth path of the variables follows
immediately.25 Human capital intensity and the quasi-rent of vintage speciﬁch u m a n
capital are determined through the supply of and demand for vintage speciﬁch u m a n
capital given in equations (1) and (11). In theorem 10 it is shown that unique values
of κ and r follow if the rate of initial schooling is not too high (τ1 <τ max
1 ).26
Third, the development of the variables of a certain vintage are determined: the
demand for adaptable labor, the vintage output of a certain technology, and the
rental rate of vintage speciﬁc human capital.

























25See Lemma 2, Corollary 3 for the output, the imports and the wage rate of ﬂexible labor. The
rest follows from the deﬁnition of the variables and Lemma 1.
26If this condition does not hold, the quasi-rent r will be negative.











Figure 1: Demand for adaptable labor and human capital intensity of a certain
vintage.
Figure 1 (a) shows that the demand for adaptable labor declines as a vintage ages.
Due to condition (14) the wage rate of adaptable labor equals the marginal pro-
ductivity of adaptable labor and must be equal across vintages. At the same time,
technological progress increases the productivity of adaptable workers in younger
vintages. Therefore, the number of adaptable workers employed decreases as vin-
tages age. When a technology is discarded after m∗ vintages, the demand for adapt-
able labor is positive.28 The economic worklife of adaptable workers has not yet
ended — they may continue to work until the statutory retirement age.
Unlike adaptable workers, labor using vintage speciﬁc skills is tied to a speciﬁc
technology. Since the input of adaptable labor decreases as vintages age, κ(v,t),t h e
ratio of vintage speciﬁc human capital to adaptable workers, increases (see Figure
1 (b). Accordingly, the productivity of vintage speciﬁc human capital decreases
as technologies become older. The rental rate of vintage speciﬁc human capital is
denoted by rV(v,t).S i n c e rV is determined as residual income, lower output and
higher wages for adaptable workers imply that rV will decrease as a vintage ages.
28See Lemma 8.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 19
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Figure 2: Income of vintage-speciﬁc human capital and adaptable labor
Thus, the income of workers using vintage speciﬁc skills decreases as they become
older. The wage gap increases. These results are exactly in line with the ﬁndings
by Violante (2002, p. 302). "... workers learn vintage speciﬁc skills and, when sepa-
rating, they can only partially transfer their skills across machines. A technological
acceleration has two eﬀects. First, it reduces skill transferability thereby increasing
wage losses upon separation. ...". Even more, a technology and human capital vin-
tage is scrapped when the income of these workers is zero (rV(v,v + m)=0 ,s e e
Figure 2). Full depreciation of human capital determines the economic retirement
age of these workers.
Unemployment of Older Labor and Statutory Retirement Age: Unlike the
statutory retirement age the eﬀective economic retirement age m∗ is endogenous and
not under direct political control. A politically determined increase in the statutory
retirement age T can only be a successful strategy as long as the statutory retirement
age is below the economically determined time of full depreciation of vintage human
capital (T<m ∗). Full depreciation of vintage speciﬁc human capital means thatStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 20
even for a zero wage these workers are not employable. The reason for this market
failure is a rigidity generated by the vintage structure of the technology, which lies in
the past of the appearance of this market problem. Hence the described mechanism










(1 − q). (18)
As a discarded vintage will never be employed again, the scrapping time also
determines the duration of unemployment at the end of the working life of this
group of workers. Hence this approach also sheds some light on the widely observed
long-term unemployment among older workers.
Technological Change and Economic Retirement: Like in most growth mod-
els technological progress is the most important variable determining growth. How-
ever, in this model technological progress has both growth and employment eﬀects.
Due to technological advances new technologies are introduced permanently. There-
fore, workers permanently have to adjust their skills. When a technology is scrapped
after m∗ vintages, it is replaced by a new technology. Therefore, the higher the rate
of technological progress, i.e. the faster technologies are introduced and old tech-




A higher rate of technological progress results in a shorter economic scrapping time
m∗.31 Thus, the last T −m∗ vintages of workers using vintage speciﬁc skills become






















31Theoretically a lower rate of technological progress leads to a later scrapping time. But the
restricting m∗ ≤ T has to be considered. If theoretically the model generates a solution m∗ >TStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 21
outdated technologies. The reason is the external depreciation of vintage speciﬁc
human capital.32 W o r k e r se n t e r i n gt h el a b o rm a r k e ta r ea b l et ou s et h em o s tm o d e r n
technology available at that time. However, a fraction of the labor force, namely
labor with vintage speciﬁc human capital, is not versatile enough to adjust their
skills to newer technologies because the present eﬀorts of lifelong learning were
not suﬃciently eﬀective for this group. Not only do decreasing earning proﬁles
of older workers occur, in the worst case older workers - belonging to the oldest
T − m∗ technologies - even have to leave the active workforce. These workers are
not employable and retire when the productive value of vintage speciﬁch u m a n









As the duration of unemployment is also determined by T−m∗ we will also obtain
an increase in the duration of unemployment.
International Integration, Outsourcing and Endogenous Retirement: In
this model increasing global competition leads to a reduction in the relative price of
imports p. Due to the small country assumption the price of imports is an exogenous




If the price of imports decreases, the demand for intermediary imports, i.e. the
level of outsourcing of domestic production in favor of international imported in-
termediary goods, will increase. Since intermediary imports can be substituted by
domestic labor services, the demand for domestic resources decreases in all vintages.
the model has to be solved backward starting with T = m∗. Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions it
can be shown that in this case the proﬁt maximization condition no longer holds.
32According to Neuman and Weiss (1995) we can distinguish between internal and external
human capital depreciation. The internal depreciation of human capital — the loss of physical
abilities and mental capacities — is not considered in the model.
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Thus, the demand for adaptable labor combined with new technologies decreases in
each vintage. Because a technology vintage is discarded, when adaptable labor is
demanded by the newest m∗ technologies, more vintages can now be combined with
adaptable labor such that the scrapping time increases. This mechanism suggests
that increasing international integration — with decreasing import prices (dp < 0) for
most of the advanced economies — may also have positive eﬀects for older workers in
OECD countries. According to the model international specialization and outsourc-











Up to this point we have discussed how diﬀerent factors determine the endogenous
retirement age from the demand side perspective of the labor market. A complex
interaction between input factors and vintage technology determines the demand
structure for diﬀerent qualiﬁcations and hence the scrapping time of vintage speciﬁc
human capital.
However, in addition to the structure of labor demand the structure of labor
supply is also relevant. For a given vintage of people a two-stage education process
generates a certain structure of skills and competencies during their working life. For
this supply structure of labor not all labor may be employable until the statutory
retirement age (the conditions are discussed above). Although the problem is es-
sentially linked to the production technology used, an important question to answer
is if and how education policy can solve the problem of a (too) rapid endogenous
depreciation of vintage speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l . C a ni th e l pt oa l i g nt h ee c o n o m i c
and statutory retirement age of vintage speciﬁc human capital? In other words, how
can we adjust the time of full depreciation of human capital vintages to match the
politically desired age? Are there policy instruments that may aﬀect the economicStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 23
retirement age within the introduced two-stage system of education? Can education
policy aﬀect unemployment of older workers and long-term unemployment of this
group?
Increasing Eﬀorts in Initial Schooling: The described problem is caused by
the depreciation process of vintage speciﬁc human capital. Skills learned during
initial schooling are fully depreciated. Therefore we were able to follow the idea of
improving initial schooling and hence the productivity of vintage speciﬁc skills to
prolong the duration of usability of these skills. In the model this policy would be
an increase in the fraction of GDP τ1 spend on initial schooling.
However, looking at the model’s results we can see that raising the fraction of
GDP spent on initial schooling does not aﬀect the scrapping time of this sort of





An improvement in initial schooling fails to reduce the rate of withdrawal from the
labor market of older workers. While resources spent on initial schooling aﬀect
the level of a number of diﬀerent variables (especially the wage of workers with
vintage speciﬁc skills), they do not aﬀect the structure of growth rates that determine
scrapping time.
Raising τ1 leads to an increasing supply of vintage speciﬁc human capital such
that human capital intensity increases as the price of vintage speciﬁch u m a nc a p i -
tal, the quasi-rent of each unit of human capital, decreases. There are two eﬀects.
First, even though scrapping time is not aﬀected, workers with vintage speciﬁc skills
achieve higher earnings for the time they are employed. Due to better education
the rental income curve of a worker’s vintage speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a lrV(v,t)hV (see
Figure 2) moves upward. Second, vintage output and thus the aggregate output
increases. Higher earnings and higher aggregate output may therefore help to im-
34See Corollary 7.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 24
prove the ﬁnancial health of the pension system. However, this is a secondary eﬀect.
Higher spending on initial schooling is neither a feasible policy option for decreasing





Increasing Eﬀorts in Lifelong Learning Programs: Since increasing spending
on standard initial schooling cannot solve the problem of synchronizing the statutory
and the economic retirement age, is there any eﬀect from higher spending in lifelong
learning programs? Looking again at the model’s results we can see that additional




Once again, the structure of the growth rates in the steady state is not aﬀected.36
However, higher spending on lifelong learning programs may lead to a higher
success rate of such programs and hence will help more people acquire the ability
to adjust to new technologies. Fewer people are expected to be left with vintage












Therefore, the problem is not solved but it becomes less severe on aggregate. In-
vestments in lifelong learning programs providing ﬂexible abilities should therefore
complement the introduction of a higher statutory retirement age.
35See Corollary 7.
36However, if the diﬀerent labor services in (7) are complements, there may also be an eﬀect on
scrapping time because an increasing productivity of skilled labor would only partially be oﬀset
by an increase in wages. Thus, the employment of additional workers with inﬂexible skills would
be possible and, as a result, the scrapping time of technology vintages would increase.Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 25
However, proposing additional marginal investments for lifelong learning pro-
grams addresses not only technological conditions. The fraction of labor targeted
by extended programs is the group where existing lifelong learning programs did
not work so far. Therefore, it can be expected that learning capabilities of this
group are at the lower end of society’s capability distribution and hence limited.
Therefore, the cost of upgrading abilities can be expected to increase signiﬁcantly.
For this group the problem of high training in return for small ability improvement
becomes even more obvious when we think of these people as older workers. As a
result, additional investment in lifelong learning programs m a yn o tp a yo ﬀ.O n l ya s
long as marginal spending on lifelong learning programs leads to a suﬃcient number
of additional adaptable workers, such that the generated additional income exceeds
the spending, will this education policy be eﬃcient. Therefore, if the learning ca-
pabilities of the remaining workers (with vintage speciﬁc human capital only) is too
low, unemployment may be an eﬃcient solution.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The employability of an aging population in a world of continuous technical change
has become one of the major concerns in today’s policy debate. Among others, the
European Union in its Lisbon Strategy emphasizes that maintaining employment
opportunities even for older workers is crucial for the EU’s competitiveness and
social cohesion. At the same time, many governments plan to increase the statu-
tory retirement age in order to stabilize their pension systems. However, in many
countries high net withdrawal rates among older workers can be observed.
Our paper intends to explain why the economic — or eﬀective— retirement age may
fall short of statutory retirement, thereby generating unemployment among older
worker cohorts. We argue that the economic retirement age has to be considered
endogenous due to the depreciation of vintage speciﬁc human capital. Furthermore,
we identify demand side factors explaining a decreasing wage proﬁle and early re-
tirement, and investigate the eﬀectiveness of policy measures on the supply side. InStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 26
particular we analyze whether improvements in the schooling system can synchro-
nise statutory and eﬀective retirement or stabilize employment levels of an aging
generation.
To analyze the economic determination of retirement we use a putty-putty vin-
tage model with heterogeneous agents. Schooling is organized in a sequential two
stage education system, namely an initial schooling program and a lifelong learn-
ing program. Initial schooling equips workers with skills that enable them to use
the most recent technology vintage available at the time when a new generation of
workers enter the market. Hence initial schooling is a technology vintage speciﬁc
training. The subsequent lifelong learning program enables workers to switch to
new technologies at any time. Lifelong learning is a resource-absorbing schooling
program that helps to adjust aging labor to a changing technical environment.
The two stage education system together with diﬀerences in learning capabilities
of the workers generates an endogenous structure of the labor force. Even all workers
participate in lifelong learning the resources spent on this program determine the
fraction of the labor force that can successfully upgrade skills and hence adapt to new
technologies. The fraction of labor that is not successful at the present volume of
spending in this program is bound to the technology vintage of their initial schooling
period. As shown in the model, upgrading skills and handling new technologies has
as t r o n ge ﬀect on the income and employability of a population vintage when the
vintage ages.
While education is often regarded as the cure for early human capital depre-
ciation, our analysis suggests that the eﬀects of education and even of a lifelong
learning program are limited with respect to the duration of employability. More
speciﬁcally, better initial schooling will aﬀect income levels and the distribution of
income but will have no eﬀect on the time path of human capital depreciation and
the economic retirement age. Even a lifelong learning program does not solve the
problem of synchronizing the economic and the statutory retirement age. From our
model we learn that lifelong learning helps to increase the individual probabilityStatutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 27
of ﬁnding a job when people grow older and hence reduces the unemployment rate
of an aging generation. However, lifelong learning will not aﬀect the speed of the
depreciation process. When deciding to either increase statutory retirement age or
improve lifelong learning institutions, the latter should be the preferred ﬁrst step
as long as the investments in the program still have a suﬃciently positive return.
These investments will lead to positive eﬀects on unemployment rates and generate
contributions to the pension system. If this policy alone is not suﬃcient the statu-
tory retirement age may be increased. Even if the lifelong learning program cannot
synchronize the eﬀective and statutory retirement for workers with lower learning
capabilities (vintage skills), a smaller fraction of labor will not reach the statutory
retirement age and drop out of the market before.
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Appendix
Lemma 1 In steady—state it is ˆ αv = ˆ βv = ˆ δv =ˆ γv =0 .





















































and it follows ˆ βt =0 . ¤





























































































































































































The second part of the proof is organized in the same way. It is
∂yV(v,t)
∂im(v,t)













































































































































































Observe that c2 is constant, because γv and δv are constant due to Lemma 1. ¤
Corollary 3 For the wage rate of ﬂexible labor the following condition holds: w(t)=
αyV(t,t)



















= αyV(t,t).Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 36
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The growth rate of yV(v,t) follow from ˆ w = ˆ λV = ˆ λ and ˆ α =0 . The statement for







Corollary 5 Equation (13) for v = t is equivalent to equation (12), i.e. it is
∂yV (t,t)
∂im(t,t) = p.





1+ρ4 a r ei n s e r t e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) . I th a st ob ec o n s i d e r e dt h a to n l yt h e
second part of Lemma 2 is used. ¤Statutory Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning 37


















Proof: A vintage is discarded, if returns of the vintage—speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a la r e
zero:
yV(t − m
∗,t) − im(t − m
∗,t)=w(t).




ˆ λm,f o l l o w i n gL e m m a2








































































Lemma 8 It is Nd
V,II(t,t + m∗) > 0 and YV(t,t + m∗) > 0.






























































































Since this condition holds, the statement follows. ¤
Lemma 9 T h ea g g r e g a t eo u t p u tY or y = Y
Nd
V,II
grows with the rate of technological
progress in steady—state.











































We diﬀerentiate this equation
˙ y = yV(t,t)
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and together it is
˙ y
y = ˆ λ. ¤
Theorem 10 The equations (1) and (11) determine uniquely the human capital in-
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Proof: In steady—state equation (1) can be written as
























∂κ(0,0) =( 1− α)
yV (0,0)




















f1(r) is a constant function and f2(r) a monotone increasing function. The unique-
ness follows. The existence is fulﬁlled, if
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